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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an appeal from an order of Judge John F.
Wahlquist of the Second Judicial District Court for Weber County
granting partial, but insufficient, relief as to the place and
conditions of confinement of pretrial detainees in the Weber
County Jail facility.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Concerning the place and conditions of confinement
of pretrial detainees in the Weber County Jail facility
Judge Wahlquist, on December 28, 1978, ordered as follows:
The Court therefore, makes the following ORDER:
1. That the Jailers are ordered to supply to the
Court concerned--whether that be a Circuit Court,
District Court, or Justice of the Peace--the names
of all prisoners who are awaiting trial and/or
sentencing in that court each Tuesday morning.
After a detainee has been in confinement for thirty
(30) days, the Court must consider that this prisoner
has automatically made a motion for release, and
should bring him into court to discover whether
there is any possible way at that time to lessen the
ordeal of his confinement; whether that be a Circuit
Court, or a District Court or a Justice of the Peace.
Each individual plaintiff must be ruled on separately
This will undoubtedly force the Court Administrator's
Office to give the matter considerable attention,
and it will undoubtedly result in certain hardships.
This, in effect, is requiring that the Court Administrators give more strict allegience to the State
Statute that requires first priority be given
to all persons charged with felonies and in confinement,
etc., and then on down the list of how courts shall
be scheduled. Those who will suffer are, first, the
public and the bar that desire to have civil matters
heard promptly; second, the convicted prisoner
space will undoubtedly suffer. Once a prisoner is
convicted, the sentencing judges frequently give
due consideration to the pretrial time served as
a mitigating circumstance to shorten the sentence.
The shortening of this pretrial confinement will
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
-1- Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

undoubtedly result in some longer sentences, and
therefore, heavier confinement in the remaining
portions of the jail. The persons benefited will be
the not guilty confined persons and prisoners genenl~
2. The court invites the County within thirty
(30) days to propose some improved form of visitation that might be allowed men in pretrial status.
The court suggests that perhaps the space used for
sentenced prisoners down on the ninth floor might
possibly be used by these personnel on the 12th
floor at a different hour. The Court is not
ordering what is called "contact visits," but does
believe that there should be an obligation to improve the visitations to the quality of those
experienced on the ninth floor.
3. The Court suggests that the County contact the
State Welfare Department to see if there is any
fund or program available that would give a detainee
who has no toothbrush, etc. , such an i tern. The Court
believes many detainees will not receive them from
other detainees.
4. The attorneys from each side are invited to
submit proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law consistent with the above indicated views. The
Court will compare the two, and sign one, or make
such modifications as it deems proper. (R.3l-32)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellantasks that Judge Wahlquist's order be reversed to the extent that the trial court abused its discretion
in failing to enter appropriate orders requiring the place and
conditions for confinement of pretrial detainees in the Weber
County Jail facility be brought into alignment with constitution·
ally mandated minimum standards for detainment of pretrial individuals.

Further, that the case be remanded to the trial

court with instructions to enter specific orders upgrading the
place and conditions of confinement of pretrial detainees to
a level which complies with minimum constitutional requ:.rements.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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FACTS
On October 26, 1978 nine pretrial detaineeJincarcerated on the south half of the 12th floor of the Weber County
Jail facility

(hereafter referred to as South-12) filed, in the

Second Judicial District Court for Weber County, a pro se petition,
challenging the place and conditions of their confinement in the
jail facility, seeking a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

(R.l) Counsel

was appointed by the court to represent the detainees (R.7) and
an Amended Complaint Seeking Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed on
their behalf on November 17, 1978.

(R.8-9)

A hearing thereon was

held before Judge Wahlquist on November 30, 1978.

(R.21).

In the interim period between the filing of the pro se
Complaint by the detainees themselves and the filing of the
Amended Complaint, two individuals 2 were tried or sentenced and
no longer remained in the pretrial status, while one individual 3
was added as a named plaintiff.

However, by the date of the final

hearing on November 30, 1978, only appellant, Mark Wickham, remained in a pretrial status.4

On December 28, 1978 Judge

1 steve Clough, Doug A. Lovell, Durwin Mason,
Dan Cottam, Larry Parks, David c. Stewart, Mark Wickham,
Duane Johnson and Clarence Holston.
2David C. Stewart and Duane Johnson
3sonny Gabaldon
4In mid-December, 1978, Mark Wickham plead guilty
to criminal charges and was subsequently sent to the Diagnostic
Center at St. Mark's Hospital in Salt Lake City for a 90 day
evaluation before sentencing.
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Wahlquist, by written Memorandum Decision, ordered partial
relief as to the conditions of confinement provided all
detainees.

pretr~)

(R.23-33)
ORIGINAL NAMED PLAINTIFFS
Appellant, Mark Wickham, was arrested on October 18,

1978 (R.ll3) on charges of auto theft and robbery (R.ll8) and •
placed in the Weber County Jail facility.

On December 9, 1978,

he plead guilty to these charges and was subsequently sent to
St. Mark's Hospital for a 90 day evaluation.
on South-12 as a pretrial detainee.

He spent 52 days

Through the November 30, 19

hearing date, he had spent the entire time on South-12 never
having been in the fresh air or sunlight.

(R.ll5)

He was total!

indigent having no funds at all with which to purchase personal
hygiene items (R.ll4) or even stamps or pencils to write letters
to family or friends.

(R.ll4, 117-118) To obtain stamps to mail

the few letters he was able to send, he traded away his food.
(R.ll5)

He had no visitors because his parents could not come

up to Ogden on Sundays to see him, this being the only day visit
ation is permitted in the jail.

(R.ll4)

It is important to

note that he remained in the jail as a pretrial detainee only
because he could not afford bail.
eligible for bail.

He was in all other respects

(R.ll6).

Larry Parks, a pretrial detainee at the time of the
filing of the original pro se petition, had been placed on s~r
12 on July 16, 1978 on a felony theft charge.

(R.ll9,128)

remained in the pretrial status until his sentencing on

He

Novem~

3,
1978,
a Quinney
period
of Funding
approximately
108
days.
(R.ll9)
During t"
Sponsored
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for digitization provided by
the Institute
of Museum
and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

period of time he,like appellant Mark Wickham, had no money
in his account at the jail (R.l20) and had to sell his food or
perform favors for more afluent detainees in order to obtain
stamps and pencils to write and mail the over 100 letters he
sent from the jail.

(R.l20, 131)

(approximately 1 letter per day)

These letters were not only personal.

Some were letters he wrote

to various courts but was unable to mail until he could barter
away his food to obtain stamps.

(R.l21)

On several occasions while Larry Parks was on South-12
in the pretrial status the area was filled to capacity with 16
individuals.

(R.l21)

This overcrowding resulted in tension,

arguments and fights between detainees.

(R.l21)

Simply to sleep

during the day one had to lie on the cement floor cushioned only
with a blanket.

(R.l23)

During summer months the jail got so hot

detainees sat around in their underwear and in winter months
wrapped themselves in blankets simply to keep warm.

(R.l23)

Medical attention was often slow in being provided (R.l24-125)
and on two occasions all of the pretrial detainees were sprayed
down for crabs.

(R.l26)

Like appellant Mark Wickham, Larry Parks

was never outdoors in the fresh air and sunlight for exercise
or recreation during his entire pretrial detainment.

(R.l26-127)

He had visitors only once - they were an elderly couple who refused to come back to see him because the visitation system was
so poor.

(R.l27-l28).
Douglas A. Lovell, arrested on a charge of armed robbery

(R.l48),

was brought to the Weber County Jail facility on August

4, 1978.

(R.l33) By the November 30, 1978 hearing date he had been

found Sponsored
guilty
ofQuinney
armed
robbery
remained
South-12
awaiting
by the S.J.
Law Library.
Funding forbut
digitization
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of Museum and Library
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sentencing.

(R. 134)

He was in a pretrial status for over 100

days.
Sonny Gabaldon was placed on South-12 on October 19,
1978 (R.l05) and was sentenced on criminal charges on October 20,
1978 (R.l09)

Even though Section 17-22-5, U.C.A. 19535 prohibits

sentenced inmates from being locked up with pretrial detainees he
remained on South-12 through November 30, 1978, a period of
approximately 41 days.

He also had some unique medical problems.

He had broken his leg very badly 10 months before being placed in
jail.

The cast had been taken off shortly before his

incarcerati~

and he was advised to exercise and keep moving his leg.

Due to

the total lack of exercise or recreation facilities in the jail
he was unable to do this.

(R.l06)

Clarence Holston had been arrested and placed on
South-12 on October 23, 1978 on charges of theft and probation
violation.

(R.l3)

By the time of the November 30, 1978 hearing

he had plead guilty, been sentenced to the Weber County Jail
facility and transferred to the lOth floor of the jail.

He

remained in a pretrial status for approximately 30 days.
Durwin Mason, at the time he signed his Affidavit in
Support of the Amended Complaint, on November 15, 1978 (R.l6)
had been in a pretrial status on South-12 for over three months.
He had severe asthma which was aggravated by the stuffy and crowdec

5Persons committed on criminal process and detained
for trial, persons convicted and under sentence, and persons
committed upon civil process, must not be kept or put in the
same room, nor shall male and female prisoners, except husband
and wife, be kept or put in the same room.
Females shall be
under
the
supervision
of
a
suitable
matron
to
be appointed by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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conditions on South-12.

(R.l6) By the November 30, 1978 hearing

however, he was no longer in the pretrial status having been
sentenced by the court.
The remaining individuals who had petitioned the
court as pretrial detainees were no longer in the Weber County
Jail facility on November 30, 1978, having been transferred or
released.
PLACE AND CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT
South-12, the maximum security area of the jail
facility (R.79), is utilized to incarcerate pretrial detainees
who are charged with felonies or Class A misdemeaners.

(R.79)

South-12 consists of an isolated area composed of three cells
and a day room with a small hall area running between the south
wall of the cells and day room and the outer south wall of the
building itself.

The general configuration of South-12, as

roughly set out in Exhibit 2 (R.34) is as follows:

N

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The two four-man cells each contain 65 square feet of floor spase.
(16.2 square feet of space per detainee).
cell contains 104 square feet of floor space.
space per detainee).

The eight-man
(13 square feet of

And, the day room area contains 195

square feet of floor space. (12.1 square feet of space per
detainee)

(R. 80)
There is no interior lighting in either the cell or day

room areas.

(R. 93,94, 98)

The only light source is located in the

hallway outside the cells and day room or, during the day, comes
through the barred windows in the outer south wall of the building
itself. On his visual inspection of South-12, Judge Wahlquist
noted "that on his visit in the middle of the afternoon, he could
have read with some difficulty in each of the spaces if he had
turned and made the proper adjustment so the light from the outer
windows was utilized."

(R.25)

There is no internal ventilation on South-12 with the
exception of a forced air heater in the southeast corner of the
area.
Along the west wall of the day room are two small,
thickly-glassed windows with a wire mesh underneath through which
pretrial detainees are permitted visitation each Sunday.

(R.84)

There are no recreation or exercise facilities
available to anyone in the jail.

(R. 83)

Chief Correctional Officer Robert D. Humphreys ack~owl~
that the overall conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees
are worse than those of sentenced inmates in the jail facility.
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(R.85) Sentenced inmates are housed in a dormitory type area,
can become trustees and can move more freely about the jail. (R.85
Officer Humphreys also acknowledged under examination that in
December, 1977, Dr. Paul Ensign, then Weber County Health Director
had inspected the 11th floor of the jail finding it to be
inadequate.
(R.99)

(R.99-100)

serious~

The 11th floor is identical to South-12

A copy of Dr. Ensign's report, admitted into evidence as

plaintiff's Exhibit 1 (R.34) determined that "the present conditions are completely unhurnan.
unhealthy.
animals."

The conditions are also very

The S.P.C.A. would not permit such conditions for
Dr. Ensign's report recommended changes to alleviate

the overcrowded and stuffy conditions, but Officer Hyrnphreys
admitted no changes had been made because the jail has insufficient space.

(R.lOl)

DAILY ROUTINE OF PRETRIAL DETAINEES ON SOUTH-12
Individuals incarcerated on South-12 as pretrial
detainees spend their entire day either locked in their cells or
locked in the day room.

(R.82)

Approximately 6:30a.m. detainees

are moved from their cells to the day room (R.Bl) where all
detainees are locked up together.

At approximately 6:30p.m.

in the evening they are returned to their respective cells.

(R.82)

There is no freedom of movement between cells and the day room
at any time.

The hallway is utilized only to move detainees

from one place to the other.

With the exception of court appear-

ances pretrial detainees never leave South-12 until sentencing
or release.

(R.83)
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Pretrial detainees are permitted one telephone call
per week, on Saturdays.

(R.84)

They may receive visitors once

a week on Sundays for approximately 15 minutes.

(R.84) No con-

tact visitation is permitted, rather visitation takes place by
yelling through the glass window and wire mesh on the west wall
of the day room area.

(R.91)

Meals are served to pretrial detainees in the day room
(R.86)

When South-12 is filled to capacity it is not unusual for

some detainees to have to sit on the floor of the day room whi:e
they eat because there are insufficient tables or benches to sit
on.

(R.l22)

Eating utensils consist of a plastic spoon and a

styrofoam cup which are provided each detainee, free of charge,
twice a week.

(R.86)

The issues which have been raised in this action on
behalf of pretrial detainees have also been raised in a federal
class action lawsuit in the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of Utah.

(Case No. NC 78-0015)

Judge Aldon

Anderson, however, on February 20, 1979, upon learning of this
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court entered his order staying any
fu~ther

proceedings in that case until such time as the Utah

Supreme Court has had this opportunity to fully address the issues
raised by appellant concerning the place and conditions of confinement of pretrial detainees in the Weber County Jail facility.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

APPELLANT'S APPEAL IS NOT MOOT IN THIS INSTANCE
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Appellant is no longer a pretrial detainee being held
on South-12 in the Weber County Jail facility.

This fact

however does not moot an appeal on the merits of this case.
It has long been recognized and is the rule in an
overwhelming majority of states that an appeal will not be
dismissed as moot when to do so would leave unsettled a question
of great public interest or one affecting the public generally.
132 A.L.R. 1179; 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, Section 81.
courts have addressed this issue.

Many

In Van de Vegt v. Larimer County,

55 P.2d 703, 710 (Colo. 1936) in a case dealing with the
power through writ of mandamus to compel the Larimer County
Board of Commissioners to issue a liquor license the question
of mootness of the appeal arose. The Colorado Supreme Court
citing Southern Pacific Terminal Co., v. ICC, 219 U.S.
498, 31

s.

Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911) held as follows:

A case is not moot where interests of a public
character are asserted under conditions that may
be immediately repeated, merely because the time
for a particular order has expired.
In a similar vein it has been held that appeals
will not be dismissed for mootness where it would be difficult
or even impossible in any other way to get a final determination
of the questions involved because the case must necessarily
become moot before the appeal can be heard.

Close v. Southern

Maryland Agricultural Asso., 108 A. 209 (1919); Doering v.
Swoboda, 253 N.W. 657

(1934).

United States Supreme Court decisions offer further
guidance on this question.

The Supreme Court has held in a long
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line of decisions that an issue otherwise rendered moot through
the passage of time or other happenstance will not be dismissed
as moot where to do so would allow the continuation of a condition "capable of repetition, yet evading review."

Roe v.

Wade, 410 U.S. 113,125, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 161 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973)
citing Southern Pacific Terminal Co., v. ICC, supra;
Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814,816, 23 L.Ed.2d 1, 89 S. Ct. 1493
(1969); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 178-179, 21
L.Ed. 2d 325, 89 S. Ct. 347 (1968); United States v. W.T. Grant Co.,
345 U.S. 629, 632-633, 97 L.Ed. 1303, 73 S. Ct. 894 (1953).
The place and conditions of confinement of pretrial
detainees in the Weber County Jail facility and the propriety
of appellant's appeal on the merits in this instance falls
squarely under the exception to the mootness dismissal doctrine.
Further, the trial court has entered its general order affecting
the place and conditions of confinement of pretrial detainees.
Judicial review by the courts of this state of the conditions of
confinement of pretrial detainees in the jail facility is primarily
a state question and is not only a question of great public
interest affecting the public generally but is also precisely the
type of situation where the unconstitutional conditions of
confinement are continuing and ongoing yet evade review due to
the relative brevity of time an individual remains in the pretrial
detainee status as compared against the length of time necessary
to pursue a trial and appeal on the merits.

Falling squarely

within the rule outlined in the cases above, appellant's appeal
is not subject to being dismissed as moot.
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POINT II
THE WEBER COUNTY JAIL FACILITY AS A PLACE OF
DETAINMENT FOR PRETRIAL DETAINEES IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERCROWDED. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN NOT LIMITING THE NUMBER OF PRETRIAL DETAINEES
TO A LEVEL WHICH COMPORTS WITH CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS.
In the Amended Complaint seeking Writ of Habeas Corpus
appellant had alleged that his Eighth Amendment federal constitutional right 6 against cruel and unusual punishment had been
violated by his incarceration as a pretrial detainee on South-12
and further that his state constitutional right to imprisonment
without unnecessary rigor under Article I, Section 97 of the
Constitution of Utah had been violated.

(R.8)

While Judge

Wahlquist did not order the immediate transfer or release of the
appeallant or other pretrial detainees from the jail facility,
he did make some remedial orders concerning the place and conditions
of confinement of pretrial detainees.

This is entirely proper

under a complaint seeking writ of habeas corpus.

In Carafas v.

LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234,238-239, 20 L.Ed.2d 554, 88 S. Ct. 1556
the Supreme Court Stated:
The federal habeas corpus statute requires that
the applicant must be "in custody" when the
application for habeas corpus is filed. This
is required not only by the repeated references

6Eighth Amendment.
Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.
?Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines
shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments
be inflicted.
Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated
with unnecessary rigor.
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in the statute, but also by the history of the
great writ.
Its province, shaped to guarantee
the most fundamental of all rights, is to provide
an effective and speedy instrument by which
judicial inquiry may be had into the legality of
the detention of a person.
See Peyton v. Rowe,
319 U.S. 54, 20 L.Ed. 2d 426, 88 S. Ct. 1549.
But the statute does not limit the relief that
may be granted to discharge of the applicant from
physical custody.
Its mandate is broad with respect to the relief that may be granted.
It
provides that "the court shall ..• dispose of the
matter as law and justice require." 28 USC §2243
The 1966 amendments to the habeas corpus statute
seem specifically to contemplate the possibility
of relief other than immediate release from physical custody. At one point, the new §2244 (b)
(1964 ed. , Supp. ii) speaks in terms of "release
from custody or other remedy." See Peyton v. Rowe,
supra; Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335 19L-.--Ed. 2d 1215, 88 S. Ct. 962 (1968). Cf. Ex Parte Hull,
312 U.S. 546, 85 L.Ed. 1034, 61 S. Ct. 640 (1941). 8
However, it is equally true that a trial court commits reversible
error and abuses its discretion in failing to exercise its power
when its exercise

~s

warranted by the facts before the court.

Strzebinska v. Jary, 193 A. 747; 112 A.L.R. 391; 5 Am. Jur. 2d,
Appeal and Error, Section 773.
Recognizing that the conditions of confinement of
pretrial detainees in the Weber County Jail "would be considered
as constitutionally cruel and inhumane if the detainees were so
held for a long period"

(R.61) and further that "Federal

decisions in this area have established as the minimally
acceptable standard 50 square feet of space per sentenced
prisoner in order to comply with constitutional prohibitions
against cruel and unusual punishment.

The Weber County Jail

8citing also 9 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law,
Article 39 of the Magna Carta 108-125 (1926)
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is inadequate in this respect and therefore severely overcrowded."
(R.61) the trial court erred in failing to enter its order requiring defendant to comply with minimum constitutional requirements of space for the detainment of pretrial individuals.
Constitutional standards of confinement for pretrial
detainees are particularly strict because the pretrial detainee
retains all rights of ordinary citizens except those necessary
to assure his appearance for trial.

Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S.

1,4, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3 (1951); Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F.
Supp.873, 897 (W.O. Mo. 1977): Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp.
594, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).

As a pretrial detainee, appellant

then enjoys all constitutional rights of a defendant on bail
awaiting trial, and any curtailment of those rights must be
justified to the extent such denial is required to insure that
he appears at trial.

Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128,

137-138 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Ahrens v. Thomas, supra, 897.
Pretrial detainees do not stand on the same footing as convicted
inmates.

Therefore, the conditions for detention must not only

be equal to but superior to those permitted for prisoners
serving sentences for the crimes that they have committed against
society.

Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F.

Supp. 676, 686 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd. 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.
1974);

Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1971)

Jones v. Wittenburg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 100 (N.D. Ohio 1971);
Ahrens v. Thomas, supra, at 898.

Incarceration of pretrial
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detainees on South-12 in what are the maximum security cells of
the Weber County Jail, when not necessary, violates the detainees
rights to due process, to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment, to be imprisoned without unnecessary rigor, and
violates their right to equal protection of the laws by unnecessarily treating them more harshly than those convicted.
Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 459, 552 (E.D. La. 1972);
Rhem v. Malcolm, supra, at 624; Brenneman v. Madigan, supra,
at 131; Hamilton v. Love, supra, at 1182; Jones v. Wittenburg,
supra,at 898.
It was the direct testimony of Chief Correctional
Officer Robert Humphreys at the November 30, 1978 trial that
pretrial detainees are treated in all respects exactly the same
as if they were already convicted inmates serving sentences in
the jail facility.

(R.85)

Indeed, Officer Humphreys testified

that all pretrial detainees whether on South-12 or elsewhere in
the jail are housed under the most harsh and restrictive conditions
in the jail facility.

(R.85).

This arrangement is completely

contrary to the clear and established law regarding the confinement of pretrial detainees and, in and of itself, established
a prima facie constitutional violation which the trial court
erred in failing to address and order corrected.
In conjunction with the independent constitutional
violation set out above, the clear and undisputed testimony at
trial also established that even under the most restrictive
standards of space requirements for sentenced individuals,South12, as the detention area for pretrial detainees, is unconstiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tutionally overcrowded.

The trial court erred in failing

to enter its order limiting the number of pretrial detainees
which may be incarcerated on South-12 to a number which would comport
with minimal constitutional standards.
Testimony at trial established that pretrial detainees
are at all times locked up in either a four man cell containing
65 square feet of space (16.2 square feet of space per detainee);
an eight man cell containing 104 square feet of space (13 square
feet of space per detainee); or in a sixteen man capacity day
room containing 195 square feet of space.
space per detainee)

(12.1 square feet of

(R.80-81)

Numerous courts have specifically addressed the issue
of adequate space for pretrial detainees so as not to run afoul
of constitutional requirements.

In Detainees of the Brooklyn

House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 398-399
(2nd Cir. 1975) a case where two pretrial detainees were being
placed in cells of approximately 40 square feet in size (20
square feet per detainee and substantially more than that afforded
detainees in any area of the Weber County Jail facility) the
court stated:
... What we are faced with here is whether
double celling in a cell 5 x 8 feet, 40 square
feet of floor space, creates such dehumanizing
conditions as to deprive the detainees of their
constitutional rights of due process and equal
protection ...
As we have noted, double celling has been
disapproved by various correctional associations
and numerous experts on prison reform.
It has
been specifically condemned by lower courts in
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt,
supra, (cell 8 x 11 feet); Tyler v. Percick,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-17-

Civil Action No. 74-40C (2) (E.D. Mo., Filed
October 15, 1974) (cell 8 x 5 feet) , and also
by state courts in Wayne County Jail Inmates v.
Wane Count Board of Commissioners, Civil Action
No. 173217 Cir. Ct. Wayne Co., Mich. July 28,
1972 and May 25, 1971), aff'd and remanded, 391
Mich. 359, 216 N.W. 2d 910 (1974) (cell 6 x 7
feet); Commonwealth ex. re. Brfant v. Hendrick,
444 Pa. 83, 280 A.2d 110 (1971 • Overcrowding
alone in pretrial detention facilities above
rated capacities has been held to create a
restrictive and deplorable living environment
constituting an intolerable violation of the
detainees' constitutional rights. Taylor v.
Sterrett, 344, F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Tex. l972);
Ham1lton v. Love, supra; Jones v. Wittenburg,
323 F. Supp. 93 and 330 F. Supp. 707, 714,
(N.D. Ohio 1971); Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d
854 (6th Cir. 1972); Hamilton v. Schiro, 338
F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970) •..
We affirm upon the findings of facts and
conclusions of law of the district court that
the overcrowding and double celling of detainees
at the two institutions create an unconstitutional
deprivation of their due process and equal protection rights. Brooklyn v. Malcolm, at 398, 399.
Similar results have been reached in other decisions.
Jones v. Wittenburg, supra, found double celling in 6 x 9
cells to be overcrowded and unconstitutional.

That case dealt

with the conditions of the Lucas County Jail, in Toledo, Ohio.
Ambrose v. Malcolm, 414 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
recognized the American Correctional Association standard of
75 square feet per inmate as being the minimally acceptable
square footage requirements for pretrial detainees.

In Ambrose

the court entered its order that no more than 29 individuals
be detained in the facility in question rather than the 40 to
60 individuals who had previously been detained in the facility.
The 29 detainee capacity was the maximum number of individuals
allowable
under
the
75Funding
square
feet
per
standard.
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Jail facility,

pretrial detainee maximum capacity on South-12 would be three
pretrial detainees.

Even assuming a lesser standard of SO

square feet per sentenced inmate were utilized (this coming from
Gates v. Collier, 423 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Miss. 1976) which has
been the minimally acceptable reported standard for sentenced
inmates, the maximum pretrial detainee capacity of each side
of the 12th floor of the Weber County Jail would be

!

pre-

trial detainees.
In Rodriquez v. Jimenez, 409 F. Supp. 582 (D.P.R.
1976) the court examined a facility housing both pretrial
detainees and sentenced inmates.

The court adopted a 70

square feet per inmate standard and found the facility to
be constitutionally lacking.

In Rodriquez, at 587 examples

were given of cell areas found to be deficient.

It should be

noted that the following examples are more spacious that the
Weber County Jail facility.
GALLERY NO.
1
II
III

AREA SQUARE FEET
234.7
237.6
234.7

NO. OF INMATES
13
12
10

AREA PER INMATE
SQUARE FEET
18
19.8
23.5

Upon issuing its interim order, before closure of the facility,
the court ruled that no more than 4 individuals could be
locked up in each of the above three galleries in accordance
with its findings of a 70 square feet per inmate requirement.
Separate and apart from the above cited cases,
dealing primarily or exclusively with pretrial detainees a
multitude of other decisions have addressed space requirements
for the constitutional confinement of sentenced inmates.
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is now settled law that pretrial detainees must be housed
and treated in conditions of confinement which are not only
equal to but superior to those of sentenced individuals.
(Citations omitted - see page 15 of this Brief).
Gates v. Collier, 423 F. Supp. 732,

(W.O. Miss. 1976)

is representative of decisions from throughout the country and
establishes the lowest figure for space per inmate in a prison
or jail which has been found acceptable.

Gates states that 50

square feet per inmate is the minimally acceptable square
footage required to comport with the constitutional prohibition
in the Eighth Amendment against cruel and unusual punishment.
In Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D. Ohio
1976), the court held 63 square feet per two inmates to be
unconstitutional.

I~

s=

holding, the district court referred

to several sources which have set minimum square footage
requirements for the sleeping space of inmates in prisons or
jails.

The court in Chapman stated:
The American Correctional Institution has concluded
that 75 square feet is the minimally acceptable
standard.
The National Sheriff's Assn. Handbook on Jail
Architecture (1975) asserts that single occupancy
detention rooms should average 70-80 square feet
(at pg. 62).
The National Sheriff's Assn. Manual on Jail
Administration (1970) suggests that in multiple
celling 55 square feet of space per occupant is
minimal.
The National Council on Crime and Delinquency
Model Act for the Protection of Rights of Prisoners
(1972) concludes that no less than fifty square
feet of floor space in any confined sleeping areas
should be provided as minimal.
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The Report of the Special Civilian Committee
for the study of the United States Army Confinement
system (1970) indicates that the Army standard
in 1969 was 55 square feet and the Army, not known
for coddling, adheres to that.
Other federal district courts across the country have
reached similar results.
1105

Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp.

(D. Del. 1977) found 60 square feet per inmate to be the

minimum.

Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873 (W.O. Mo. 1977)

found double celling in cells of 75-77 square feet to be
unconstitutional.

At the circuit court level, the 50 square

foot standard per inmate was approved in Newman v. State of
Alabama, 559 F. 2d 283

(5th Cir. 1977).

Most importantly, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed a 60 square foot per inmate standard used by the United
States District Court for Oklahoma in Battle v. Anderson, 564
F.2d 388
318

(lOth Cir. 1977).

See also Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp.

(M.D. Ala. 1976) requiring 60 sq. ft.; and Martinez v.

Jimenez, 409 F. Supp. 582 (D.P.R. 1976) requiring not less than
10 x 7 square feet.
The square footage afforded pretrial detainees in the
Weber County Jail facility is far below the minimum constituional
square footage requirements set out above for either pretrial
detainees or even for sentenced inmates.

The trial court found

that there is an average number of nine pretrial detainees
locked up on South-12 on a daily basis (R.54) although it is
undisputed that there are on occasion 16 individuals on South-12
in a pretrial status (R.l21,137)

As pointed out previously

however,
even
this
average
daily
population
far Services
exceeds
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any constitutionally permissible level.

The entire jail facility,

originally designed to hold only 52 men, has a total cell area squay.
footage capacity in the mens cell areas of 1427 l/2 square feet
(R.l02) for both pretrial and sentenced individuals.

If filled

to capacity (presently 112 beds) (R.l02) this would yield
approximately 12.7 square feet of space per individual in the
entire jail.

Under the minimum acceptable standards found by

the courts as exemplified by Gates v. Collier, supra, which
established a 50 square feet per inmate minimum standard, the
maximum capacity of the jail facility at any given point in time,
under constitutional standards, would be 28 individuals.

Yet,

the jail facility on the November 30, 1978 hearing date had 89
individuals in the jail.

(R.lOl) of which, Chief Correctional

Officer Humphreys estimated that on a daily basis 40 per cent
would be pretrial detainees.

(R.lOl)

According to the unanimous weight of authority, the severe!
overcrowded Weber County Jail facility violates the constiutional
rights of appellant and all other pretrial detainees in that the
conditions of their crowded confinement amounts to cruel and
unusual punishment; violates their right to due process;
violates their right to equal protection; violates their right
against cruel and unusual punishment and violates their right
to imprisonment without unnecessary rigor.

That overcrowding

of jails violates an inmate's constitutional rights and adversely
affects society was recognized by the New York State Court in
Cooper v. Morin, 398 N.Y.S. 2d 36 (1977).
that case:

The court stated in
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Overcrowding of prisons or local detention
facilities violates the due process and equal
protection rights of the inmates therein. Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention for Men
v. Malcom, (2nd Cir.) 520 F.2d 392, 399,
Costello v. Wainwright, (M.D. Fla.) 397 F.Supp.
20 aff'd (5th Cir.) 525 F. 2d 1239, vac., 539
F.2d 547, revd., 430 u.s. 325, 97 s.ct. 1191
51 L.Ed.2d 372 (1977) .
... correctional institutions must be more than
mere depositories for human baggage ... (Detainees
etc., supra, at 397) A free democratic society
cannot cage inmates like animals in a zoo or
stack them like chattels in a warehouse and expect
them to emerge as decent, law abiding, contributing
members of the community.
In the end, society
becomes the loser. Costello, supra, at 38.
The sole justification for the conditions of confinement found in the Weber County Jail is that there is no where
else to put pretrial detainees and no money to construct better
facilities .

However, the rationale provides no justification

whatsoever.
We restate settled principles of federal
jurisprudence, i.e.; that constitutional treatment of human beings confined to penal institutions
is not dependent upon the willingness or the financial
ability of the State to provide decent penitentiaries.
Gate v. Collier, supra,at 742.
The conditions under which pretrial detainees are
incarcerated in the Weber County Jail clearly and unquestionably
violates settled principles of constitutional law.

The only

justification relied upon by the trial court in not finding the
conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees unconditionally
unconstitutional was that pretrial detainees were not held under
such conditions for longer periods of time.

(R.61)

This con-

elusions however, is not supported by the evidence nor does it
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provide a justification regardless of the length or brevity of
time a pretrial detainee might be subjected to such conditions.
Chief Correctional Officer Humphreys acknowledged under
examination that the average length of time a pretrial
individual might await trial on Southl2 was approximately
30 days up to as many as 90 days.

(R.83)

The undisputed

testimony of appellant was that he had been in a pretrial
status for approximately 52 days (R.ll8); Larry Parks had been
a pretrial detainee for 108 days (R.ll9);

Douglas A. Lovell

had been in a pretrial status for over 100 days (R.l34);
Gabaldon had been on South-12 for 41 days (R.l05);

Sonny

Clarence

Holston was in pretrial detainment for approximately 30 days (R.ll
and Durwin Mason had been on South-12 for over 90 days.

(R.l6).

Such clear violations of constitutional standards do not
permit such a justification to stand.

Pretrial detainees may not

be subjected to conditions amounting to punishment until after
they have been found guilty of a criminal offense.

It must be

remembered that:
Pretrial detainees are no more than defendants
waiting for trial, entitled to the presumption
of innocence, a speedy trial and all the rights
of bailees and otherordinary citizens except those
necessary to assure their presence at trial and
the security of the prison. Brooklyn House of
Detention for men v. Malcolm, supra, at 397 citing
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. ~89 S.Ct. 1322,
22 L.Ed 2d 600 (1969); Tate v. Short, 401 u.s.
395, 91 s.ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d 13o-TI971); Williams
v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.
2d 586 (1970);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488,
81 S. Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d. 231 (1960); Collins v.
Schoonfield, 344 F.Supp. 257 (D.Md.l972); Seale v.
Manson, 326 F.Supp. 1375 (D.Conn. 1971); Davis v.
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Lindsay, 321 F.Supp. 1134, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
see Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions
of Pretrial Detainees, 79 Yale L.J. 941 {1970)
As the trial court in Jones v. Wittenburg, supra,

at

100 pointed out if constitutional rights of pretrial detainees are
being violated they are entitled to immediate relief at the hands
of the court.

In this case however, no relief has been provided onl

justification and excuse.

The trial court erred in failing to

exercise its power by immediately ordering the reduction of the
pretrial population to a level in accord with constitutional
requirements or at the least establish a clear and definite
timetable by which the population level of pretrial detainees
incarcerated on South-12 would be reduced to an acceptable level
with the prohibition that the number of pretrial detainees on
South-12 not exceed constitutional levels in the future.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REQUIRE THAT
REGULAR CONTACT VISITATION MUST BE PROVIDED TO
PRETRIAL DETAINEES.
The trial court erred in failing to order that contact
visitation must be provided to pretrial detainees on a regular
basis.

The testimony was undisputed and indeed the trial court

found that no contact visitation of any sort was permitted
pretrial detainees.

(R.57,62)

The trial court in his conclusions

of law specifically stated(R.61-62):
Further, the visitation facilities and practices
utilized in the jail do not comply with current
law in reference to pretrial detainees in that
the visitation and practices as presently permitted
in the jail do not allow for contact visitation
between pretrial detainees and friends or family;
and, additionally, the frequency of visitations
permitted to pretrial detainees are inadequate.
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With this specific conclusion however, the trial court merely
ordered that defendant submit a plan for improved visitation but
declined to order contact visitation.

(R.67)

In Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
aff'd 527 F.2d 1041 (2nd Cir. 1975) the court held that pretrial
detainees in the Manhattan House of Detention had a constitutional
right to contact visitation.

This decision has remained the law

ever since and is now a settled principle of constitutional law
to which pretrial detainees are universally entitled.

In Rhem

the type of visitation found to be deficient was an arrangement
whereby pretrial detainees were allowed visitors twice a week
for 30 minutes at each session.

Detainees sat in booths

and communicated with visitors by telephone while looking through
a bullet proof glass window. Even this arrangement, found unconstitutional by the court, was substantially better than the
visitation system outlined by Judge Wahlquist in paragraph 13
of his findings of fact.

(R.57)

Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977) reached
an identical conclusion in examining the Duval County Jail in
Jacksonvill~

Florida, a facility with many similarities to the

facilities and practices found in the Weber County Jail.

At the

Duval County Jail, inmates were forced to yell, three at a time,
through windows in each cellblock.

This arrangement prevented

any privacy or physical contact whatsoever.

A plan for contact

visitation was ordered submitted to the court.

Any restrictions

on contact visitation were then required to be on institutional
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..

security rather than institutional convenience.

The only basis

upon which contact visitation may be denied any particular
pretrial detainee is based upon the individual detainee being
classified a peculiar security risk.

A blanket denial of contact

visitation to pretrial detainees is constitutionally impermissible.
In Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm,
supra, at 835 the court stated:
This court is not unaware of the City's concern
with the security of its institution and the
possible effect contact visits may have on this
legitimate concern. However, the possibility of
a classification system to determine which inmates
are security risks and thus should not participate
in contact visits has been upheld. Rhem v. Malcolm,
supra,507 F.2d at 338.
Moreover, the fiscal difficulties of New York
City cannot absolve the defendants of their
constitutional obligations. This argument has
been dismissed repeatedly by the Court of Appeals
in this Circuit, reminding us that "an individual's
constitutional rights may not be sacrified on
the ground that the city has other and more pressing
priorities •.. Denial of the presumptively innocent
detainee's constitutional rights prepresents an
impermissible price to pay for this retention in
custody.
The same decision has been reached in Ahrens v.
Thomas, supra; O'Bryan v. County of Saginaw, Mich., supra; and
Berch v. Stahl, 373 F. Supp. 651 (W.D.Ky. 1976).
Most recently in Marcera v. Chinlund, 47 Law Week
2562 (2nd Cir. 2/27/79) the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
definitively stated:
The right of pretrial detainees to regular
contact visits is grbunded on the bedrock of
our criminal juisprudence : an individual
accused of a crime is presumed innocent, and
may not be punished, until a jury finds him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thus pretrial detainees
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may be subjected only to those restraints on their
liberty that inhere in the confinement itself or
are clearly justified by the "compelling necessities
of jail administration." These necessities do not
include cost or mere administrative inconvenience.
While reasonable classification schemes designed
to weed out those detainees who would present intolerable security risks if granted contact visits
are permissible, blanket prohibitions are banned.
In sum, it is too late in the day to suggest that
it does not offend the Constitution not to permit
pretrial detainees contact visits ••. (emphasis added)
The Marcera court went on to hold that it was an
abuse of the trial judge's discretion not to have awarded the
plaintiffs in that case interim relief and ordered that the
respective defendants immediately formulate and submit to the
trial court plans for implementing contact visits within a perioo
of one year.
By failing to order contact visitation either commencing
immediately or within a reasonable time for pretrial detainees whc
are not exceptional security risks the trial court in this
matter committed error to the extent that pretrial detainees,
entitled to contact visitation as a matter of right, have been
denied the same.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PROHIBIT THE
INCARCERATION OF PRETRIAL DETAINEES IN THE WEBER
COUNTY JAIL FACILITY DUE TO THE TOTAL LACK OF EXERCISE
OR RECREATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES OR ALTERNATIVELY TO
ENTER ITS ORDER THAT REMEDIAL STEPS BE TAKEN TO
PROVIDE ADEQUATE EXERCISE AND RECREATIONAL FACILITIES
WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME.
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Testimony at trial in this matter was undisputed
that there are no exercise or recreational facilities or
opportunities available to pretrial detainees in the Weber County
Jail facility.

(R.83)

The trial court noted in paragraph 16 of

his findings of fact (R.59) that "There is no access to an
ordinary exercise space, fresh air or sunlight •.. Detainees in
general have no exercise except that incidental to stretching,
leaning on walls, and walking around one or two steps at a time."
In his conclusions of law the trial court concluded as follows
(R.6l):
In addition, federal decisions, as applied to
states through the 14th Amendment to the United
States Constitution, have clearly established
that pretrial detainees as well as sentenced prisoners have an absolute right to outdoor exercise,
recreation, fresh air and sunlight. None of these
opportunities are available to detainees or sentenced
individuals incarcerated in the Weber County Jail
and the 'ail is constitutional! defective in this
respect.
emphasis a
Having determined that the Weber County Jail facility is
constitutionally defective in these respects it constitutes error
for the trial court not to act to remedy the constitutional defects.
As Judge Wahlquist recognized pretrial detainees
have an absolute right to outdoor exercise, recreation, fresh
air and sunlight.
point.

Ahrens v. Thomas, supra, is squarely on

That case dealt with conditions of confinement of pre-

trial detainees in the Platte County Jail in Missouri.

In Ahrens

pretrial detainees were confined to tank areas without access to
any areas outside the tank for recreation or exercise purposes.
The court ruled as follows:
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The total lack of recreation and exercise
facilities and programs at the Platte County Jail
violates due process. Brenneman v. Madigan,
supra, at 140; Jones v. Wittenburg, 330 F. Supp.
at 717; Hamilto~Landrieu, supra; Taylor v.
Sterrett, 344 F. Supp. 411, 422 (N.D.Tex. 1972),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 499 F.2d 367 (5th
Cir. 1974); Hamilton v. Love, supra, at 1193.
Confinement in the Platte County Jail without
an opportunity for regular outdoor exercise constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.
Sinclair v. Henderson, 331
F. Supp. 1123, 1129 (E.D. La. 1971).
In Rhem v. Malcolm, supra, the court held that the
right of pretrial detainees to reasonable physical exercise is
fundamental. In Rhem, even before the court examined the
exercise program, the detainees had some exercise available to
them.

Each detainee was permitted a 50 minute exercise period

once a week on a small, outdoor rooftop area of the facility.
For pretrial detainees this was found to be constitutionally
inadequate.
Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 423 F. Supp. 1250 (D.N.H. 1976)
examined the exercise program for convicted inmates in protective custody at the New Hampshire State Prison.
had some indoor and some outdoor exercise.

There inmates

The court, however,

found the program so limited as to endanger the prisoner's
health and therefore concluded that the restraint on the inmates
right to exercise constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F. Supp. 1123, 1131,
(E.D. La. 1971) held as follows:
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... confinement for long periods of time without
the opportunity for regular outdoor exercise does,
as a matter of law, constitute cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.
The same result was reached in Miller v. Carson,
supra, which held that state prisoners through the 14th Amendment
have an absolute right to outdoor exercise.
In accord with these decisions see also Smith v.
Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373

(5th Cir. 1977); Moore v. Janing, 427

F. Supp. 567 (1976): O'Bryan v. County of Saginaw, Mich.; 437
F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1977): and Wright v. Raines, 571 P.2d
26 (Ct. of App., Kan. 1977).
Once again, there is no justification in the difficulty
in providing space for exercise and recreation.

Rhem v.

Malcolm, supra, at 627 spoke directly to this point.
The difficulty of providing space for exercise
in an urban institution is unacceptable as justification for the deprivation imposed on MHD inmates .••
Where necessary, courts have required structural
alterations to provide the required space, see,
e.g., Hamilton v. Love, supra, 328 F. Supp. at
1193 and decree of June ~971 Par. 70; Wayne
County Inmates v. Wayne County Board of CommiSSioners,
Civil No. 173217 Cir. Court, Wayne County,
Michigan, July 28, 1972, at 25-6, and have ordered
that particular periods of exercise be made available, Hamilton v. Landrieu, supra, 351 F.
Supp. at 550, or that outdoor exercise areas be
created, Taylor v. Sterrett, supra, 344 F. Supp.
at 422.
See also, Holland v. Donelon, Civil No.
71-1442 (E.D. La. June 6, 1973) at 12 and cases
cited, Brenneman v. Madigan, supra, 343 F.
Supp. at 135, 140; Conklin v.-aancock, supra,
334 F. Supp. at 1122 and Jones v. Wittenburg,
supra, 330 F. Supp. at 717.
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In circumstances where, as in the Weber County Jail,
there are no exercise or recreation facilities of any kind; and,
the conditions are so bad as to cause the physical and mental
deterioration of pretrial detainees 9 (see plaintiff's exhibit 1)
(R.34) the failure of the trial court to prohibit the confinernent of pretrial detainees under such condition or at the least
to enter its order requiring the correction of these conditions
within a reasonable time in an abuse of discretion which must
be corrected on appeal.
POINT V
THE PRACTICE OF REQUIRING INDIGENT DETAINEES
TO PURCHASE THEIR OWN STAMPS FOR THE MAILING OF
LETTERS VIOLATES BOUNDS V. SMITH, 430 U.S.
817, 52 L.Ed. 2d 72 S. Ct. 1491 (1977)
The uncontroverted testimony at trial herein revealed
that it is not uncommon for some pretrial detainees to be indigent
having no money in an account with the jail.
118,120,121)

(R.96,114,115,117,

Indeed the testimony of Larry Parks revealed that

he had even written some letters to courts but was unable to send
them because he had no money with which to purchase stamps.
(R.l20-121)

The primary way appellant Mark Wickham and witness

9
Dr. Ensign stated:
They spend all day in this room and the night in bunk
rooms with similar conditions while awaiting trial.
What does an inmate do under such conditions? Just
what you or I would do - deteriorate phsyically and
mentally, be exposed to and have our resistance to
disease lowered, think of ways to get out, find things
to complain about, become very depressed, maybe even
think of ways to get even.
It doesn't take much skill
to see that this is a very unhealthy situatio~.
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Larry Parks obtained stamps was to trade away their food to more
affluent detainees.

(R.l20)

The practice of requiring all detainees, including
indigent detainees, to purchase stamps for mailing letters and
pencils to write them with violates the detainees right of access
to the courts and is a direct violation of Bounds v. Smith, supra.
In Bounds, at 824 Justice Marshall writing the majority opinion
of the court stated:
Moreover, our d~cisions have consistently
required States to shoulder affirmative
obligations to assure all prisoners meaningful
access to the courts.
It is indisputable that
indigent inmates must be provided at state expense with paper and pen to draft legal documents,
with notarial services to authenticate them, and
with stamps to mail them.
It was an abuse of the trial court's power to fail to correct
this constitutional violation. Appellant asks that this matter be
remanded to the trial court for entry of an appropriate order.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
PROHIBIT THE INCARCERATION OF SENTENCED
INDIVIDUALS WITH PRETRIAL DETAINEES AS
REQUIRED BY SECTION 17-22-5, U.C.A. 1953.
Section 17-22-5 provides that sentenced individuals
may not be kept or put in the same room as pretrial detainees.
Testimony at trial in this case revealed that witness Sonny
Gabaldon had been locked up in the same room with appellant,
after having been sentenced, for a period of approximately
40 days.

(R.l09)

This was in direct violation of the state

statute and further, infringed upon appellant's right to
confinement without unnecessary rigor as a pretrial detainee in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-33-

Weber County Jail facility.
The trial court abused its discretion in failing to
order defendant's strict compliance with Section 17-22-5.
CONCLUSIONS
The evidence presented at trial in this matter and the
case law which supports that evidence is largely undisputed.

The

defendant's position throughout this action has been to generally
agree that the Weber County Jail facility is substandard but not
really so bad as to require the imposition of a judicial remedy
to the situation.

The error with this position however, is that

for pretrial detainees the poor physical conditions, the severe
overcrowding and related problems of the facility surpass constitutionally permissible levels and enter the realm of unconstitutio:
and prohibited activities and conditions.

When proper facts are

presented to the court, as in this instance, requiring judicial
intervention, it is as much error for the trial court to fail to
exercise its power as for a trial court to act in excess of its
power.
In this case proper facts, requiring the exercise of its
power, were presented to the trial court which in turn failed to
order the necessary relief mandated by the settled constitutional
law in this area.

This failure to act, on the part of the court,

is subject to reversal with a remand of the case to being made
to the trial court with instructions to enter appropriate orders
bringing the Weber County Jail facility up to a constitutional
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par.

Appellant respectfully asks that the Utah Supreme Court

enter its decision accordingly.
DATED this

/tdday of
UTAH

f.J

,

1979.

EGAL SERVICES, INC.
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